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 5 
Introduction 6 
This essay concerns energy security, or more specifically energy insecurity, in Central and South-Eastern 7 
Europe. Insecurity can be defined as a situation in which vulnerability from a particular danger or threat is 8 
perceived to exist. Threats generally come from external sources, but can also come from within, and 9 
usually have an existential quality. Energy is existential in that it underpins modern life—we use it to 10 
provide power, heat and light to our homes, workplaces and cities; to fuel our cars and other forms of 11 
transport; to help produce and power technology; and even to help us grow and process the food we eat. 12 
Energy is a critical resource and as such it is a commodity of significant strategic importance, particularly 13 
with regard to access. The main concern that has driven the rise of energy insecurity has been ‘security of 14 
supply’. This refers to the ability of states and other users to guarantee sources of affordable energy, 15 
sufficient to meet their needs across all economic and business, societal and even politico-military 16 
activities. Energy insecurity exists when internal actions, those by third parties, or even natural disasters, 17 
threaten to, or actually do, disrupt the supply or affordability of energy. 18 
Energy insecurity is not unique to Central and South-Eastern Europe. The region shares many concerns 19 
with other parts of Europe and states across the globe. However, because of the historic legacies of the 20 
region’s communist past, some of the vulnerabilities and threats it faces are more pronounced. For 21 
example, the region is highly dependent on imports of fossil fuels such as petroleum and natural gas, with 22 
some states importing as much as 60%–100% of their needs from a single supplier, the Russian 23 
Federation. (Other than Romania, nearly all Central and South-Eastern European states are dependent on 24 
natural gas imports, with almost 100% of requirements imported by Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 25 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia—FYRM, 26 
Moldova, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia.) Monopolization of the market by Russia, as the primary 27 
supplier, means that long-term bilateral export-import contracts tend to be less favourably priced, 28 
resulting in higher energy costs. The mix of energy types used by states in the region is considered to be 29 
less diverse than in Western Europe, meaning that any disruption to their primary energy type could be 30 
problematic. This is especially so when it is acknowledged that the region’s import infrastructure is 31 
dominated by static pipelines built during the Soviet era and that integration with Western European 32 
infrastructure is limited. Without suitable alternative energy access or adequate storage any problem with 33 
the pipelines, or with the source of gas (or oil) entering the pipeline system, can have serious 34 
consequences for import-dependent states. 35 
The importance of pipelines cannot be underestimated. They have provided the Central and South-Eastern 36 
European region access to oil and gas for decades, and this has determined how the region obtains much 37 
of its energy needs. Until recently, the situation was more challenging for natural gas because the expense 38 
and lack of technical capability to liquefy and regasify natural gas meant that its transportation was only 39 
realistically capable via pipelines. Since, as a liquid, oil could be transported via tankers, oil pipelines 40 
were not as critical, although they remain by far the cheapest and quickest means to transport oil, and the 41 
most suitable for some of the region’s landlocked countries. As a result of these issues, Central and 42 
  
South-Eastern Europe is considered to be the most vulnerable region of Europe with regard to energy 43 
security. Even those countries with substantial domestic energy sources, such as Poland (coal and lignite), 44 
have become increasingly reliant on imports of low-carbon fuels like natural gas, as they seek to meet the 45 
strict climate change targets introduced by the European Union (EU) for the reduction of CO2 emissions. 46 
Much of this natural gas has also been imported by pipelines. In order to better understand how pipeline 47 
politics plays a role in creating challenges and vulnerabilities for Central and South-Eastern Europe’s 48 
energy security, as well as informing policy solutions, we need to consider the region’s relations with its 49 
primary and potential energy suppliers, such as Russia, and with its partners in the wider EU. 50 
 51 
Energy and the EU 52 
In Europe, until recently, there has been a growing demand for energy. It is considered that energy 53 
consumption levels within the EU peaked around 2005 (when gross inland energy consumption reached 54 
1,824.7m. metric tons of oil equivalent, according to Eurostat figures, compared with 1,671.1m. tons in 55 
1995 and 1,666.3m. tons in 2013), and improved efficiency of energy use was predicted to result in 56 
further reductions in energy consumption. In comparison with the EU as a whole, energy consumption 57 
levels of the Central European countries peaked much earlier than those of their Western counterparts. 58 
However, by 2035 domestic production of primary fossil fuels was also predicted to decline: of oil, by 59 
57%; of coal, by 49%; and of natural gas, by 46%. As a result, it is assumed that energy imports will 60 
remain constant to cover around 55% of consumption, while natural gas imports will increase by around 61 
49%. This means that the EU is likely to remain the world’s largest net importer of natural gas. It is 62 
important to note, however, that the levels of imports are not balanced across all the EU member states, 63 
and some countries import much more than those others that have domestic resources available. 64 
Overall, the EU currently imports about 53% of all the energy it consumes. This includes imports 65 
amounting to around 66% of the gas it uses and 90% of the crude oil, 42% of coal and other solid fuels 66 
and 40% of nuclear fuel. The majority of these imports come from a small group of countries—the 67 
Russian Federation, Norway and Algeria. Because of the nature of the EU’s infrastructure and geographic 68 
proximity each of these supplier countries tends to direct their products to specific clusters of EU member 69 
states. As already mentioned, the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe are predominately 70 
supplied by Russia. When energy imports are concentrated among a few supplier states, there is an 71 
increased risk of vulnerability should external matters result in disruption to supply and sufficient 72 
alternative mechanisms to counter that disruption are not in place. For a number of the countries of 73 
Central and South-Eastern Europe this is exactly what happened in 2006, and again in 2009, when Russia 74 
suspended gas sales to Ukraine—one of the primary transit routes for Russian gas imports. These two 75 
Russia–Ukraine gas crises, and the fact that the majority of the countries of the region are now members 76 
of the EU, is often used to explain why the EU has become more involved in energy matters and why 77 
energy has increasingly become an area of integration activity at the EU level.  78 
Matters are a little more complex, however. Energy has always been important for the European 79 
integration project, from its foundation as the European Coal and Steel Community, through the 80 
establishment of, in turn, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), the Energy Charter Treaty, 81 
and the Energy Community, and an Energy Union, a Framework Strategy for which was adopted by the 82 
European Commission in February 2015. There have always been ebbs and flows in the intensity of 83 
policy development, but since the 1990s and early 2000s interest in energy has grown significantly at the 84 
EU level. Import dependency has not been the only factor behind this rapid expansion of energy interests. 85 
The promotion of market liberalization and growing concern for environmental matters and climate 86 
change have also been hugely important. This tripartite justification for the increased interest in energy 87 
  
can also be used to explain the EU’s securitization of energy. It is necessary to recognize that there has 88 
also been a fluctuating hierarchy of importance across these three drivers. 89 
In the early 2000s it was very much the last two factors (market liberalization and the climate agenda) that 90 
were most significant. Questions about supply did exist, but it is important to note that they tended to be 91 
framed in the context of market forces, and were about ensuring affordable supplies and improving the 92 
connectivity of market infrastructure to ensure regular supplies at reasonable prices amid growing 93 
demand. Diversification of suppliers was primarily about opening the market to competitive forces and 94 
preventing monopolistic pricing structures. This is not to say that questions over transit routes or 95 
reliability of suppliers were not a concern, rather that they were not the priority. Fears about unreliable 96 
suppliers ‘turning off the tap’ were not on the agenda, and Russia was more or less regarded as a safe and 97 
secure supply partner. 98 
Central and South-Eastern European countries fell in line with this general EU position and this was 99 
evident in the language they used at the time. Acutely aware of energy challenges primarily stemming 100 
from their time under communist regimes, and in advance of their accession to the EU, the Central 101 
European countries initiated co-operative efforts to support their integration into the wider EU energy 102 
market. For example, in 2002 the Visegrad Group (V4—comprising the Czech Republic, Hungary, 103 
Poland and Slovakia), under the presidency of Hungary, initiated the V4 Energy Working Group to 104 
support the economy ministries in the V4 countries in the improvement of co-operation across the energy 105 
sector. The main purpose was to improve information exchange in support of market liberalization across 106 
the region, speed up privatization strategies, and ensure the maintenance and expansion of storage 107 
facilities—all demands posed by the EU to the Central European candidate states. Improved 108 
interconnections with Western Europe were also recognized as necessary to support market integration.  109 
Diversification away from Russian supplies was not considered a rationale for this type of co-operation. 110 
When diversification was mentioned it was viewed as ‘in addition to’, rather than ‘instead of’, Russian 111 
supplies. It was about choice and price. As Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány stated, ‘Mad 112 
would be the country which was happy about depending on a single supplier for the purchase of a 113 
strategically important service and product’, thus highlighting the fact that replacing Russia as a single 114 
supplier with an alternative would not resolve the fundamental challenges informing energy insecurity. 115 
This could be recognized when proposals were put forward in 2002 for a major new pipeline that was 116 
intended to open up the EU market to natural gas from the Caspian and Central Asia regions. The 117 
consortium behind this project, which became known as the Nabucco Pipeline, initially involved Austria 118 
and Turkey, and was soon joined by Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, demonstrating the importance of 119 
these countries as transit states for the proposed pipeline and the opportunity for them to benefit from 120 
access to the piped gas. All three countries are highly dependent on Russia for their gas imports and have 121 
paid premium prices via take-or-pay contracts with Russia. Having additional sources of gas imports 122 
would potentially give these countries increased leverage in any future gas contract negotiations. 123 
 124 
The Emergence of Pipeline politics: Nabucco versus South Stream 125 
Nabucco was developed in response to the discovery of the Shah Deniz (Şah Deniz) gasfield in the 126 
Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea in 1999. Comprising some 330 sq miles, Shah Deniz is one of the 127 
largest oil- and gasfields to be discovered in recent years, and it began production in 2006. Nabucco was 128 
intended to provide transit of natural gas from this field to Europe and was at first considered a 129 
commercial venture, but it was not long before the project took on a political undertone, although for the 130 
Russian Federation it always held political connotations. 131 
  
The Nabucco project was potentially threatening for Russia because it challenged its effective monopoly 132 
on gas imports to Europe, specifically Central and South-Eastern Europe. It is not to Russia’s advantage if 133 
that region, as Russia’s largest customer, has alternative suppliers, thus providing an opportunity to 134 
bargain on price. For Europe this is exactly what Nabucco was intended to achieve: to increase 135 
competition and reduce prices. For the EU and its member states two occurrences served to alter their 136 
position towards Nabucco and shift it from being a predominately commercial venture to a political one. 137 
The first of these was the first Russia–Ukraine gas crisis in 2006, in which disagreement over the price of 138 
gas to be paid by Ukraine resulted in the suspension of gas flows from Russia to Ukraine for four days. 139 
As Ukraine is the major transit route for gas destined for the EU markets, the disruption to levels of gas, 140 
exacerbated by Ukraine allegedly siphoning gas intended for EU countries, resulted in a significant 141 
decline in supplies. For some Central European countries this was a serious problem. It highlighted their 142 
failure to ensure adequate stored gas supplies and emphasized their over-reliance on Russia as single 143 
supplier. Furthermore, the trustworthiness of Russia as a supplier and Ukraine as a transit country, which 144 
had previously been accepted, was called into question. 145 
The second matter was the emergence of alternative competitor pipeline projects promoted by Russia. 146 
Initially, Russia had suggested an extension of its Blue Stream gas pipeline via Turkey as a way to 147 
provide an additional access point for Russian gas into Europe. It eventually decided against this, and in 148 
2007 it announced the South Stream project, which entailed the construction of a pipeline under the Black 149 
Sea, through Bulgaria and Serbia, and into Hungary, with the aim of supplying Europe with some 150 
63,000m. cu m of gas per year. For Russia, the purpose of South Stream was twofold: it sought, first, to 151 
reinforce Russia’s dominant position as the primary gas supplier to Central and South-Eastern Europe, 152 
and secondly, to open up possible new opportunities by providing Russia with a southern access point to 153 
its European markets without the need to transit Ukraine. This would be a good fit with the parallel 154 
proposed Nord Stream pipeline under the Baltic Sea, which would directly link Russia to Germany, and 155 
provide some 55,000m. cu m of natural gas per year. By establishing both these projects, Russia was 156 
essentially claiming that it could remain a viable and reliable partner by providing new transit routes. In 157 
so doing, it effectively sought to accuse Ukraine of responsibility for problems with natural gas transit to 158 
the EU. Second, South Stream allowed Russia to present a project as a direct rival to Nabucco and to seek 159 
to prevent its monopoly on gas supplies from being eroded too quickly. Russia claimed that South Stream 160 
would be more competitive and less expensive to build. It also created uncertainty for possible investors 161 
because it raised questions about the sustainability of two competing pipelines. 162 
Russia failed to convince many in Europe that it could be trusted, and rhetoric which made reference to 163 
energy as a foreign policy tool, as well as some of the actions undertaken by Russia towards energy-164 
importing and transit states, fuelled the rise of a discourse in Western political, academic and media 165 
circles emphasizing ‘a new Cold War’, ‘energy wars’ and an ‘energy weapon’. Energy had become highly 166 
political. In the southern corridor space, the Nabucco and South Stream pipeline projects were suddenly 167 
framed as Europe versus Russia, thus emphasizing political tensions. Inevitably, it was less 168 
straightforward than this, because principal EU member and candidate states from Central and South-169 
Eastern Europe were partners in both projects, thus adding to the complexity of the situation. 170 
None the less, what became apparent in Europe during this time is a clear shift in the framing of energy as 171 
a security concern, with pipeline politics perceived as a crucial element in this development. A second 172 
Russia–Ukraine gas crisis in 2008–09 reinforced concerns about security of energy supplies for Europe 173 
and specifically for the Central and South-Eastern European countries. However, the ultimate success of 174 
this securitization of pipelines within the wider energy security discourse is questionable. 175 
Nabucco was prioritized as a high-level European project with a clear political and security rationale, and 176 
was supported by the EU and the USA. The reason it became so politicized was in part a result of the 177 
need to secure political backing and justification for funding support. This was coupled with its 178 
  
identification as a possible signature project by the European Commission, which was seeking to develop 179 
its energy policy competencies, both internally and externally. The Russian–Ukrainian gas crises, the 180 
urgency to diversify supplies, and growing concern about Russian use of energy and pipelines as foreign 181 
policy tools, allowed the project to be securitized as a means to introduce alternative suppliers, break the 182 
Russian monopoly and ultimately curtail Russia’s ability to use energy for political means. The 183 
securitization of the Nabucco pipeline project effectively prolonged its existence in a way that would not 184 
have happened were it to have been a standard commercial project. Despite this apparent wealth of 185 
political support, commercial viability remained fundamental, and no matter how much political backing 186 
the project received, if it proved financially unfeasible it would be unable to progress. This is exactly 187 
what happened, and Nabucco effectively stagnated as a project. Strangely, this outcome was widely 188 
predicted, yet there seemed to be a form of collective denial, and whenever any party, such as some of the 189 
more frustrated Central European countries, did suggest that the project was not likely to come to fruition, 190 
they were castigated and shamed as being ‘anti-European’, or insufficiently supportive of energy 191 
solidarity within the EU. 192 
 193 
Pipeline Politics: Economic versus Political Rationales 194 
The need for commercial viability resulted in further competitor pipeline projects emerging to challenge 195 
both Nabucco and South Stream. The most significant of these was the Azerbaijani- and Turkish-owned 196 
Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which was announced in 2011 and would effectively 197 
replace the need for much of the Turkish section of the original Nabucco project. This forced the Nabucco 198 
consortium to re-evaluate their proposal. The rebranding of Nabucco as ‘Nabucco West’ reflected the 199 
truncation of the project as a spur pipeline from TANAP through Central and South-Eastern Europe. This 200 
revised project looked more achievable and even economically viable, but the ongoing economic crisis 201 
and the investment of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) in Greece, where it 202 
purchased 66% of the Greek Transmission Network Operator in 2013, may have had an influence on a 203 
2013 decision by the SOCAR-led Shah Deniz consortium to award a contract for the transit of TANAP 204 
gas to the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), rather than to Nabucco West. TAP had initially been proposed 205 
as early as 2003 as a pipeline to be constructed through Greece and Albania to Italy, and following the 206 
award of the contract, the TANAP consortium purchased shares in TAP, reinforcing it as the official 207 
extension of TANAP in Europe. TAP had been placed in direct competition with Nabucco West, which 208 
was to run further to the north, as the primary route for the European section of the southern energy 209 
corridor. 210 
The political concerns of the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe and the EU that drove the 211 
need for Nabucco were not shared by Azerbaijan and its Shah Deniz-TANAP partners; thus it was not 212 
surprising that a more modest project with a seemingly higher investment return was selected. This leads 213 
to questions concerning the relationship between commercial activity and political requirements. If 214 
something is so important that it warrants the type of prioritization that Nabucco received, then it has to 215 
be supported by relevant financial investment for political means. This did not happen for Nabucco, 216 
which was predicated by the need to adhere to market-led requirements. Political neutrality is required if 217 
the market is to operate as it should. Herein lies the paradox: that energy policy cannot be politically 218 
neutral. European countries know this, as does the EU, and when the market is allowed to take 219 
precedence, it will adversely affect the ability of national governments to ensure that large infrastructure 220 
projects of strategic (if not commercial) importance are fulfilled. This is one of the significant challenges 221 
for Europe and for the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe that need improved infrastructure 222 
but are unable always to rely on the market providing it. How can the economics be balanced with the 223 
politics? 224 
 225 
  
The Problem of South Stream 226 
The failure of Nabucco West to win the Shah Deniz contract effectively meant that the project became 227 
untenable. As a consequence, in order for the southern gas corridor to reach Central and South-Eastern 228 
Europe the possible options were either a secondary spur from TAP, perhaps into Bulgaria, or Russia’s 229 
South Stream project.  230 
Though a Russian project, South Stream had the support of a number of the countries of Central and 231 
South-Eastern Europe, including Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, the FYRM and Serbia, as well as 232 
Italy and Austria. This demonstrates the fact that Russia remains an important strategic partner within the 233 
energy sector for these countries. Each of these countries had signed contracts with Russia to complete 234 
various primary and secondary parts of the pipeline along its European section. Despite the enthusiasm of 235 
the countries of the region for South Stream, the project encountered a number of challenges. These 236 
included accusations from the European Commission in December 2013 that the contracts signed between 237 
Russia and EU member states, and with Serbia (which, while a candidate country for EU membership, is 238 
a member of the Energy Community), were in violation of the EU’s Third Energy Package regulations 239 
concerning ownership of pipelines by natural gas extractors and the right for third party access to the 240 
pipeline. In June 2014 the project was effectively halted, owing to a European Commission infringement 241 
procedure against Bulgaria concerning non-compliance with EU procurement requirements. Bulgaria had 242 
also been threatened with possible sanctions by the USA, owing to the participation of Russian company 243 
Stroitransgaz in the consortium awarded the contract to build the Bulgarian section. At the same time, as 244 
for Nabucco previously, there were questions over the financial viability of the project. Competition from 245 
other energy projects and sectors (such as the increased adoption and affordability of liquefied natural 246 
gas—LNG) was creating a more challenging environment where long-term contracts and fixed pipelines 247 
become expensive and inflexible. Ongoing political tensions owing to conflict in eastern Ukraine, 248 
following the annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea by Russia in March, and the ensuing 249 
imposition of Western sanctions on Russia in response, also had a negative impact on the project, and in 250 
December Russia announced that it was to abandon South Stream in favour of a new pipeline project to 251 
be developed in co-operation with Turkey. The new TurkStream pipeline was proposed within the 252 
framework of the Russian-Turkish Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Co-operation. 253 
However, following the shooting down of a Russian fighter jet by the Turkish military on the Turkey–254 
Syria border in November 2015 and the subsequent imposition of Russian sanctions against Turkey, 255 
which included the suspension of the Intergovernmental Commission, TurkStream was also in effect 256 
suspended. It was not clear if there were other rationales for the rapid decision by Russia effectively to 257 
freeze this project, but it serves to highlight how geopolitics and energy supply can intersect.  The 258 
survival of the TurkStream project has also been conditional on geopolitics and the project was reinstated 259 
in October 2016 following improved political relations between Russia and Turkey. This rejuvenation 260 
coincided with a cooling of relations between Turkey and Europe and the USA because of Turkey’s role 261 
in managing the Syrian refugee and migration crisis and the purges that followed the failed July 2016 262 
coup d’état against President Erdoğan.  The construction of TurkStream began in May 2017 and it is 263 
expected that the first and second strings of the pipeline which will deliver gas to both Turkey and to 264 
southern and southeastern Europe will total 15.75b cu m of gas. For Russia this is also enables it to 265 
continue with the objective to implement ways to bypass Ukraine and other former Soviet republic transit 266 
states.    267 
 268 
Implications for Central and South-Eastern Europe 269 
The cancellation of the Nabucco and South Stream pipelines has had significant implications for Central 270 
and South-Eastern Europe within the context of the southern energy corridor. First, it highlights that their 271 
perceived energy needs, even when framed in strong security terms, are not strong enough to override 272 
  
financial realities. Economics takes precedence over politics. It also confirms that this part of Europe is 273 
likely to remain reliant on the Russian Federation, and that routes via Ukraine are likely to continue to be 274 
important for the foreseeable future unless possible new, land-based routes—such as the spurs from 275 
TAP—are developed, or defunct projects reactivated, as has been the case with the TurkStream pipeline.  276 
Such projects would also only benefit the Central and South-Eastern European region if they can connect 277 
to existing or new transit and storage infrastructure. This is the idea behind the proposed Eastring project 278 
promoted by Slovakia and supported by Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania.   279 
When considered in terms of diversification of supply and access to new sources of gas, this is potentially 280 
problematic for the region; however, it has also compelled the countries of Central and South-Eastern 281 
Europe carefully to consider new responses to their energy insecurity in a post-Nabucco and post-South 282 
Stream context. 283 
The governments of the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe have been astute, understanding 284 
that their energy security could never be entirely reliant on the southern corridor pipeline projects. Those 285 
projects, if they had come to fruition, might have given some long-term stability of supply, but they 286 
would not have resolved the other major problems they face in terms of energy insecurity—specifically 287 
their integration into the wider EU energy infrastructure. A north–south corridor had been identified as a 288 
major missing link in this infrastructure allowing connection of various energy systems (gas, oil and 289 
electricity grids) from the Adriatic in the south to the Baltic in the north. With the demise of the large 290 
project for a southern corridor (not taking TAP or TurkStream into account), this north–south corridor has 291 
become even more essential, and specific projects of common interest have been agreed at EU level. 292 
Many of these projects will be incorporated into the broader conceptualization of regional energy 293 
frameworks. For example, the concept of north–south has been extended to what the EU now terms 294 
‘North–South East’, in which the promotion of a series of smaller energy infrastructure projects would 295 
allow the development of a connection linking the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas. This would be 296 
achieved by investing in existing infrastructure and building reverse-flow interconnectors between 297 
countries across the region. The countries of Central Europe have been promoting this idea for some time, 298 
but until recently it has always taken second priority to the large pipeline projects. As it turns out, it may 299 
take a more significant and relevant role in supporting the development of energy security for the region. 300 
The fact that these interconnectors allow reverse flow should also provide for a sharing of gas resources 301 
in times of stress. 302 
Locating sources of financing for these small-scale projects has also been difficult, and the countries of 303 
Central and South-Eastern Europe have looked to the EU for financial support. The EU recognizes that 304 
there are occasions when such projects need financial support and has been more supportive of this type 305 
of project that it has of ‘grand pipeline projects’ such as Nabucco, because they can be delivered more 306 
quickly and cheaply. This has been one of the rationales behind the Eastring project where it has been 307 
claimed that the advantage of the pipeline lies in the fact it is comparable to Nabucco or South Stream in 308 
terms of added value for the European energy sector, but deliverable at significantly lower cost. Capital 309 
expenditure is estimated to be €2.06bn which is considerably lower than the €7.9bn cost for Nabucco or 310 
€6bn for South Stream. As such the EU has given Eastring the status of  Project of Common Interest, thus 311 
guaranteeing the highest level of political support and making it eligible for EU funding. 312 
The need to ensure improved infrastructure is also important because it allows the region to benefit from 313 
LNG as an alternative to piped gas. The Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) are a good example 314 
of a former ‘energy island’ region that has sought to use LNG as a means of obtaining gas from new 315 
suppliers. There have been problems in agreeing the location of LNG terminals in the Baltic region, 316 
emphasizing the fact that countries continue to perceive great benefit in being the host of energy facilities. 317 
A new LNG terminal has entered into operation in Poland, while, on the Adriatic, another was planned in 318 
Croatia. Progress towards the construction of the Croatian terminal has been repeatedly delayed, with 319 
feasibility studies only being carried out in 2015, despite the proposals having been under consideration 320 
  
for several years. It was intended that the two terminals in Poland and Croatia would be connected by 321 
2020, allowing the so-called north–south corridor to be completed. It is likely that the Croatian terminal, 322 
which will be a floating facility, will not be completed until 2019 at the earliest and will have reduced 323 
capacity of 2b cu m gas per year in comparison with the original proposed land-based terminal. Like other 324 
small regional projects it has benefited from EU funding, receiving €102m from the EU’s Connecting 325 
Europe facility.   326 
Another way that the countries of Central Europe have sought to improve their energy position has been 327 
through increased gas storage. Most of the countries in the region learned a harsh lesson from previous 328 
Russia–Ukrainian gas crises, and the concern about a possible reduction in supplies following the 329 
annexation of Crimea appeared to justify the efforts to increase storage for critical points of the year. All 330 
countries in the region successfully coped with a simulated stress test on their gas supplies undertaken by 331 
the European Commission in 2014. Suggestions stemming directly from that exercise, which concluded 332 
that improvements to regional infrastructure should be completed more rapidly, led to the establishment 333 
of the so-called Central East South Europe Gas Connectivity High Level Group, which first met in 334 
February 2015. The High level group has representatives from across the wider Central and South-Eastern 335 
European region, including nine EU member states – Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 336 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia – and six Energy Community Contracting parties – Ukraine, Moldova, 337 
Serbia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  338 
 339 
The Return of Pipeline Politics 340 
The southern energy corridor has without doubt been the scene of some of the more complicated pipeline 341 
projects with direct impact on the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. It is, however, not the 342 
only area of pipeline activity that bears upon the energy concerns of these countries. The Baltic Sea is the 343 
location of the Russian- and German-supported Nord Stream pipeline. Becoming operational in 2011, 344 
Nord Stream was from its inception in 2005 just as controversial as the pipelines planned in the south. 345 
Acting as an alternative transit route for Russian gas into Western Europe, Nord Stream would bypass 346 
traditional transit states, including Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. This 347 
raised considerable concern over the possible loss of transit fees should gas be diverted away from 348 
traditional routes. Other concerns that were raised included those focusing on the ecological environment 349 
of the Baltic Sea, security issues with respect to the use of the Russian Baltic Fleet for protection of the 350 
pipeline, and access to Polish ports.  351 
Unlike Russia’s South Stream pipeline, Nord Stream was completed on schedule and its dual pipelines 352 
now connect Russia directly with Germany, although it currently only operates at one-half of its capacity 353 
(27,500m. cu m), due to the EU’s Third Energy Package third-party access requirements, which restrict 354 
Gazprom’s access to the Ostsee-Pipeline-Anbindungsleitung (OPAL) pipeline that connects Nord Stream 355 
with the Czech Republic. Despite this, Russia, recognizing that this pipeline route has been its only 356 
successful pipeline project in recent years, has identified the route as suitable for expansion and has 357 
proposed a Nord Stream 2 pipeline project. Completion of the new project would increase operational 358 
capacity from 55,000m. cu m to 110,000m. cu m, enabling Russia to fulfil its policy of transit avoidance 359 
and potentially to bypass Ukraine in most of its exports to the EU of natural gas. Both the tensions 360 
surrounding the continued conflict in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine (which 361 
commenced in mid-2014) and the January 2016 decision, by Ukraine’s state utility Naftogaz Ukrainy, to 362 
increase transit fees for Russian gas by 50%, have reinforced the potential benefits of Nord Stream 2 for 363 
Russia. The temporary suspension of the TurkStream pipeline also made Nord Stream 2 even more 364 
important, as it would be the only alternative new transit route available to Russia.  365 
  
While there may be economic or commercial rationales for Russia and its Western energy company 366 
partners (Uniper of Germany, Austrian-based OMV, Royal Dutch Shell—of the Netherlands and the 367 
United Kingdom, German producer Wintershall Holding GmbH and French utility company Engie) to 368 
promote Nord Stream 2, many countries will doubtless also perceive political rationales. As the President 369 
of Lithuania, Dalia Grybauskaitė expressed: ‘It is highly regrettable that our big partners (in Europe) are 370 
trying to explain to the EU member states that it [Nord Stream 2] is only a private commercial project. 371 
We all are very well aware that all energy projects of this scale are geopolitical, and their goals are 372 
precisely geopolitical.’ It was this position that was stated in a joint letter, sent in March 2016 by nine EU 373 
member states (Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and 374 
Romania) to Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission. They argued that the 375 
pipeline failed to reflect the EU’s intention, underpinned by the strategy set out for the Energy Union, to 376 
diversify energy sources, and therefore posed ‘risks for energy security in the region of Central and 377 
Eastern Europe, which is still highly dependent on a single source of energy’. This is something that the 378 
European Commission has since recognised and Maroš Šefčovič, European vice-president for energy, has 379 
since explicitly stated that Nord Stream 2 would not help to diversify Europe’s energy sources.  Nord 380 
Stream 2 would reinforce European reliance on Russian energy sources and have economic implications 381 
for those countries that remained reliant on transit fees, specifically Ukraine and Slovakia. Although it has 382 
divided Europe, Nord Stream 2 is still regarded to be of significant commercial value and the western-383 
based firms backing the project have it have agreed to provide half of the financing, with the other half 384 
coming from Gazprom. Thus, Nord Stream 2 has not needed to seek EU finance to be built. This suggests 385 
that the relative strength of countries and big corporations with regards to which pipeline projects are 386 
successful is important.  It highlights a difference between the north and the south of Europe, with 387 
projects such as Nabucco or South Stream failing to be taken seriously because of the limited influence of 388 
those countries supporting them, and smaller projects often having to seek strategic EU financial support 389 
in order to even move beyond the feasibility stage. More importantly, the geopolitics underpinning 390 
projects like Nord Stream 2 helps to create a rather acrimonious situation, pitting the European 391 
Parliament, the European Commission and key member states of the EU, as well as Russia, against each 392 
other. 393 
 394 
Conclusion 395 
Amid the collapse of the large-scale pipeline projects designed to address the energy insecurity of Central 396 
and South-Eastern Europe, smaller practical solutions have appeared to allow the region to respond more 397 
effectively and quickly. They are more easily financed and can draw upon key EU financial aid projects 398 
allowing them to be completed in a more manageable timeframe. As such, they perhaps suggest that the 399 
large pipeline projects are not always the best solution to energy insecurity and can actually increase that 400 
insecurity for Central and South-Eastern Europe. This is certainly the case with regard to the Nord Stream 401 
2 pipeline project, which highlights that for some countries, specifically energy providers such as Russia, 402 
pipelines still have value, but that they can come at a cost for others. 403 
Does this mean that the issue of pipeline politics and energy security has been overplayed in Europe? On 404 
the one hand, yes, perhaps it has. Enmeshed in a cycle of geopolitical power play, it is easy to 405 
overemphasize the security threat to Europe’s energy, but, in reality, Europe and the countries of Central 406 
and South-Eastern Europe have been able to respond and develop alternative solutions to the challenges 407 
confronting them. However, there is more to this story concerning the EU, its member states and its 408 
neighbours. Energy will remain one of the areas in which politics continues to be played out, and this has 409 
an adverse impact on the ability of the EU to present a united front. The South Stream project clearly 410 
demonstrated that EU member states do not necessarily all agree with each other about how certain 411 
energy projects should evolve. South Stream, prior to its cancellation, proved the existence of a 412 
substantive division between EU institutions such as the European Commission and some of the countries 413 
  
of Central and South-Eastern Europe—specifically Hungary and Bulgaria. The differences of opinion 414 
between the EU member states of the region and Germany with regard to Nord Stream 2 reflect similar 415 
concerns. The rhetoric of member states regularly spills out into the forums provided by the EU 416 
institutions, and these institutions increasingly have their own positions to promote. This raises questions 417 
about concepts such as energy solidarity in Europe and the commitment of member states to abide by the 418 
EU’s market regulations in the field of energy. The EU’s Energy Union, which was launched in February 419 
2015, was in part established to respond to large-scale controversial and contested pipeline projects as a 420 
means of strengthening the energy supply security of its members. It is intended to enhance the EU’s role 421 
negotiating on behalf of its members, to improve the concept of solidarity and to promote the free 422 
movement of energy through a completely integrated and liberalized market as a ‘fifth freedom’, 423 
alongside the right of establishment and freedom to provide services, and the rights to free movement of 424 
goods, workers and capital. Although this should improve the ability of the EU and its member states to 425 
engage with Russia and other large suppliers, it is also likely to face challenges in doing so if it lacks the 426 
support of all of its members. For example, both the Czech Republic and Hungary, despite officially 427 
supporting the Energy Union’s development, have publicly queried various strategies promoted by the 428 
Energy Union to achieve that solidarity. 429 
Although as stated at the beginning of this essay, Central and South-Eastern Europe is considered to be 430 
the most vulnerable region in Europe for energy insecurity, the reality is that the level of insecurity may 431 
be overemphasized. Certainly, the region has encountered clear problems and the geopolitical and 432 
geoeconomic power play surrounding large-scale pipeline projects has not helped to lessen that insecurity. 433 
The role of pipeline politics is also unlikely to diminish while pipeline projects remain the most beneficial 434 
or cost-effective approach for energy suppliers. However, the use of alternative technologies, including 435 
LNG and renewables, as well as promoting smaller interconnector or regional pipeline projects and 436 
overall greater regional co-operation, has had a positive impact on the region’s ability to address some of 437 
its energy security challenges. Differences of opinion and policy preferences do remain and national self-438 
interest may still challenge a common EU position, but it is unlikely that the region will in the future 439 
again face the same level of energy insecurity that it experienced during the Russia–Ukraine energy crises 440 
of 2006 and 2009.  441 
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